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EASEMENT OF LATERAL SUPPORT OF LAND.
The right of lateral and subjacent support is that
right which the owner of land has to have his land supported
by the adjoining land or the soil beneath. Farrand v. Mar-
shall, (19 Barb. 380). And adjacent proprietors may have the
right to enjoy the benefit of having one parcel laterally
supported by the other.
Th-is does not seem to be an absolute rijht of sup-
port, but rather that every land owner has a right to have
his land preserved intact and that an adjoining owner must
not excavate upon his own land so near the land of his neigh-
bor as to cause the soil to crumble under its own weight and
fall upon his land. And every man has a right to have his
soil left intact. But if the land is such that it will stand
intact of its own coherence, and the adjoining owner can dig
up to the line without injury to the land, he has a right to
do so.
But this absolute right to lateral support does not
extend to buildings or other additional weights imposed upon
the lands, unless they have gained an easement of support
from tne adjacent land, and it is in regard to this addition-
al weight upon the land t_±at many interesting questions and
cases have arisen, anid the difference of opinion of the courts
in modern cases has arisen where the land in its natural
state has been burdened with houses.
And there is a distinction bptween soil falling
into an excavation of its own inherent weight, and that which
was pressed in by the building.
Thus in Brand v. Murphy, (37 Vt. 99), it was said
that every land owner is entitled to have his land preserved
intact, but if it appear that the falling was the result of
weighty erections upon the adjoining land, the defendant1 s
liability is removed.
This statement is modified in Wood on Nuisance,
(2d Ed. Sec. 178), where it is said that it is incumbent on
the defendanit to make out his defense by clearly establishing
tile fact that the injury would not have resulted except for
the erections; that is, that the pressure of the building was
the principal cause of injury to the soil.
And although one may dig in his own land for all
lawful purposes, (Panton v. Holland, 17 Johns. 92), yet he
has no right to do this carelessly, nor with intent to in-
jure the adjoining property, and although a person on build-
ing a house adjoining the house of another may lawfully sink
his foundation below the foundation of his neighbor, he is
not liable for any consequential damages, provided he has
used due care and diligence to prevent any injury to the
house of the other.
By the law of Solon, if any one should build a
wall he should leave a space of a foot between it and his
neighbor's land; if a house, two feet; if he should dig a
sepulchre or a ditch, he should leave a space equal to its
3depth; if a well, the distance of a pace. But this space re-
quired by the la-is of Greece and Rome is said to have been
part of the family religion and had nothing to do wtth later-
al support. And it is obvious that this law, while just in
its time, would hardly do in these changed times, especially
in our large cities, where every available inch of space is
used.
And the general rule as to the right of lateral
support is, that where the rights of the parties relate to
the soil in its natural state, neither shall excavate his
own soil so as to cause that of his neighbor to be loosened
and fall into such excavation. (2 Rolle, Ab. Trespass, 1 Pl.
1.) This dicta of Rolle's was based on the decision of the
case of Wilde v. Minsterley, (15 Can., 1 B. R. Pasch 384),
and Lord Campbell in Wyatt v. Harrison, (3 Barn. & Ad. 871),
in referring to this dicta treated it as an authority for the
doctrine of support, and it has ever since been referred to
as sustaining that doctrine. And what the doctrine really
asserts is, not that A may not dig in his own land up to the
line of his neighbor's land, if he can do so without letting
down his neighbor's land, but he cannot do so, so as to let
it down, leaving the fair inference to be drawn that he may
dig with impunity when the nature of the soil is such that it
will stand intact by the force of its own cohesion. (Wood on
Nuisances, 2 Ed. Sec. 172).
To digress from the subject for a moment,- an in-
teresting question arose in The Mayor of Birmingham v. Allen,
j(37 L. T. Rep. N. S. 207), as to what was meant by the term,
"neighboring land", when used in regard to lateral support.
The suit was for an injunction to restrain defendant from
working his mines, which lay near plaintiff's lands, in such
a manner as to cause the wasting away of plaintiff's land and
injury to his buildings. T'-ere was an intervening strip of
land between the property of this plaintiff and defendant
which had been mined with the knowledge and consent of the
plaintiff and evidence tended to show that if this land had
not been mined the defendant might have worked his land up to
his boundary without any injury to plaintiff and he would
have a right to do so. The question was, whether the inter-
mediate excavation by a third party could have the effect of
lessening that right.
It is clear that if defendant was to be considered
plaintiff's "neighbor" and his land "neighboring" or "adja-
cent" to the plaintiff's land, as these terms are understood,
he could be restrained.
The argument was advanced that all land owners must
be considered a man's neighbors whose operations in any re-
mote degree injure his land. But the court was of the opin-
ion that the term could not have so wide a meaning and said,
that the "neighboring owner" must be the owner of that por-
tion of land, the existence of which in its natural state is
necessary for the support of the land. And this seems to be
the correct solution, for otherwise a man might be made lia-
ble for the acts of another over which he had no control.
The question of negligence does not come in when
the question is in regard to the damage done to the soil in
its natural state. For if the adjoining owner takes away the
natural support of the land and the land is injured, we have
seen he is liable, although he used diligence in the matter
and was not negligent.
It is possible, however, that certain cases may
arise where an adjacent owner is not liable for the injury to
the unencumbered soil. Thus it was held in Hendricks v. Min-
ing Co., (58 Cal. 190), that where plaintiff and defendant
were adjacent land owners and both engaged in mining on their
lands, the defendant was not liable for the falling away of
plaintiff's lands caused by these mining operations where the
work was not carelessly or improperly done.
The case of Thurston v. Hancock, (12 Mass. 220),
decided in 1815 is generally referred to as a leading one in
this country. The facts were as follows: The plaintiff in
1802 built a house on his own land within two feet of his own
boundary. Ten years after this the defendant, having pur-
chased the adjoining land, began grading and digging away the
same, but kept within five or six feet of the plaintiff's
land; notwithstanding this, the soil of the plaintiff was
undermined and he was obliged to take his house down, as it
was unsafe to live in, and he sues for damages to the house
and premises. But the court held he was without remedy for
the injury to his house, as there was no negligenee or malice,
and the plaintiff was in fault for he built too near defend-
6ant's line and by so building he cannot deprive the defendant
of the use of his land. But the court went on and said that
the defendant should have anticipated the consequences of
digging so near the line, and that the defendant was liable
for the damage arising from the falling of the natural soil
into the pit so dug, but not for the damages done to the house,
for ulhen an excavation is made, even with the exercise of the
highest care and skill possible, for injury to the soil which
is not burdened with buildings, the adjoining owner is liable
and excavates at his peril, as it is an interference with a
natural right and liability attaches whether the digging was
accompanied with negligence or not.
And this statement of the liability of an adjacent
owner for injuries to unencumbered land is the law at the
present time, the difficulty in many of the subsequent cases
arising where the land has been encumbered with erections.
This case was followed in 1861 in the case of Foley
v. Wythe , (2 Allen 131). The facts herein were similar to
those in Thurston v. Hancock, supra; the defendant by carry-
ing away large quantities of clay and earth caused the plain-
tiff's house to settle and crack, thereby lessening its value.
The court said that few principles of the law can be traced
to an earlier or more constant redognition than the one stat-
ed by Rolle. And the conclusion at which they arrive Is,
that in the absence of any proof of carelessness, negligence
or unskilfulness in the execution of the work, so far as the
house was concerned, a jury had no right to regard, as an
element of damage, the fact that such di ging caused the
foundation of the plaintiff's house to arack and settle, al-
though he was entitled to recover for causing the natural
sol of the plaintiff to fall into the excavation made by
the defendant. And in this they coincide with the rule which
was practically applied in Thurston v. Hancock, supra. And
it was further said that an adjacent owner in order to make a
justifiable use of his o.na land must have a proper respect
to the appropriation which has already been made by the own-
ers of the surrounding territory and therefore when one makes
an excavation on his own land he must consider how it will be
likely, in view of the existing and actual occupation of oth-
ers, to affect the soil of his neighbor. But it is not nec-
essary that one subject himself to extraordinary expense in
guarding against such injury. Thus if there was no house on
the land he might excavate for a considerable distance with-
out substituting any safeguard, as a wall; whereas, if there
was a house on the land he might expose but small portions of
the soil at a time. But, as said before, he would only have
to use reasonable care and diligence, and he would not have
to prop up his neighbor's house, if the owner was cognizant
of the excavation being made, in order to prevent its falling.
(Peyton v. Mayor, 9 Barn. & C. 725; Charless v. Rankin, 22
Mo. 566).
In this case of Foley v. Wythe , supra, the plain-
tiff wished the court to decide the question as to whether
buildings which do not sensibly increase the pressure upon
the land deprive a party from an action for interference
with the natural right of lateral support, and if defendant
sought to escape liability on the plea that there are erect-
ions on plaintiff's land, he must make out his defense by
showing that the injury would not have resulted except for
the erections; that is, that the presence of the buildings
was the principal cause of injury to the soil. But the court
said it was not necessary to decide this point in order to
decide the case.
In O'Neil v. Hawkins, (4 Bush. 653), the court
noticed the distinction in regard to structures which do not
contribute to the injury and held that a division fence
should not be regarded as such an increased burden upon the
soil as to prevent the recovery of damages for the lateral
support to land. And this on the ground, that such a fence
was a necessary incident to the enjoyment of such a lot and
it could not be regarded as a sensible increase of burden on
the land.
But this decision may be doubted if its reasoning
is carried out to its logical conclusion, for it can be read-
ily seen that even a fence, if made of stone or other weighty
material, might become quite a burden upon the land.
And it was held in Gilmore v. Driscoll, (122 Mass.
201), that the plaintiff could recover for the unencumbered
land which fell on account of defendant's digging, but no re-
covery could be had for the injury to the fences and shrub-
bery, because the natural right of support extends to the
land itself and does not include buildings and other improve-
ments thereon.
And this case (decided in 1877) follows Thurston v.
Hancock, supra, and discusses the American and English cases
generally upon the subject of lateral support.
In Brown v. Robbins, (4 H. & N. Exch. 186), the
question was left to the jury "whether the land fell from the
superincumbent weight of the house, or whether it would have
fallen in the same manner whether there had been a house upon
it or not", and in this particular case the jury found that
the weight of the house did not contribute to the injury.
And the court said that the moment the jury found that the
subsidence was not caused by the weight of the buiL1dings, the
existence of the house became unimportant in considering the
question of defendant's liability, and it is the same as if a
mere model of a house stood there which bore so small a pro-
portion to that of the soil as to practically add nothing to
it. And this case is said to establish fully, that the mere
pressure upon land of a superincumbent weight, as buildings,
or anything else, does not prevent a recovery for the inter-
ference with the right of support, where the superincumbent
weight does not contribute to the injury, and that in such a
case, recovery may be had not only for the soil, but for all
buildings standing upon it, if they were not the cause of the
injury itself. And the court may have been influenced in its
decision by the pertinent question of counsel: "Has a person
a right to dig so near the land of his neighbor as to disturb
his soil whether there is a house there or not?" This case
is approved in Rici ards v. Jenkins, (18 L. T. Is. S. 445).
But it may be questioned whether this decision was
entirely correct, for it is obvious that every pound of addi-
tional weight imposed upon the surface increases the vertical
and lateral pressure, and that the weight of several thousand
pounds, such as would likely be imposed by the most ordinary
buildings, would in a measure contribute to the subsidence of
the soil beneath them. This case of Brown v. Robins, supra,
is directly bpposed to Thurston v. Hancock, supra, and the
other American cases. (W7ood on Nuisances, 2d Ed. Sec. 178)
One of the earliest cases in New York upon our sub-
ject is that of Panton v. HQlland, (17 Johns. 92). The plain-
tiff was the owner of a house and lot in New York City, and
the defendant in erecting a house on the lot adjoining the
plaintiff dug some distance below plaintiff's foundation by
reason of which the walls of plaintiff's house were cracked
and the house damaged, for which plaintiff seeks to recover
damages. The court held that the defendant was not liable
for any consequential damage provided he had used due care
and diligence to prevent any injury to the house of the other,
and said that no man should be held liable in damages for the
reasonable exercise of a right when it is accompanied by a
cautious regard for the rights of others, where there is no
just ground for the charge of negligence and unskilfulness,
and when the act done is not done maliciously. And it was
also said that the degree of care of a person excavating can-
not be defined but must necessarily depend upon the circum-
stances of each case. Thus the character of the soil, the
condition of the wall under building, the depth of the excav-
ation, and all those conditions that a man of ordinary pru-
dence would observe.
But even a better rule than this was laid down in
Thurston v. Hancock, supra, where it was said "that if the
mere exercise of a lawful right to remove the soil upon his
own premises occasioned the fall of the structure, no liabi-
lity exists, but if the fall is occasioned by the manner in
which it is removed, the liability attaches for all the con-
sequences of the act." And it is said that no more than ord-
inary care is required, although there must be an absence of
negligence or of unskilfulness and of improper motive. (Mc
Guire v. Grant, 25 N. J. L. 361; R. R. Co. v. Reaney, 42 Ud.
117)
The next important New York case in which this
question arose was Lasala v. Holbrook, (4 Paige 169). The
case arose upon an application to dissolve an injunction by
which the defendant had been restrained from digging in his
land so near the plaintiff's church (which had been erected
more than thirty-eight years before, and stood six feet from
the line between the parties) as to injure the walls of the
church.. The injunction was dissolved and the court said that
the defendant had a right to dig a pit upon his own land if
necessary to its convenient and beneficial use, when it can
be done without injury to the adjacent land in its natural
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state, and that a person cannot be deprived of the use of his
own land by erecting a building on the adjoining lot, the
weight of which will cause my land to fall into the pit which
he may dig, in the proper and legitimate exercise of his pre-
vious right to iraprove his own lot.
But it was conceded that this case would have been
differently decided had an easement of support of the house
been gained by grant from the owner of the adjacent lot.
(Cox v. Matthews, 1 Vent. 237; Story v. Oden, 12 Mass. 157)
And in this connection the case of Bononi v. Back-
house, (27 L. J. Q. B. 388), is a leading English case in re-
gard to the right of support of buildings. The facts were,
that A was the owner of certain houses standing on land which
was surrounded by lands of B, C and D. E was the owner of
mines running underneath the lands of all these persons. He
worked his mines in such a manner without actual negligence,
that the lands of B, C and D sank in; and after an interval
of six years, their sinking occasioned injury to the houses
of A, and A brought an action to recover damages for the in-
jury, and it was held that he was entitled to recover. The
court said that the right to support of land and the right
to support of buildings stand upon different footings as to
the mode Of acquiring them; the former being prima facie a
right of property analagous to the flow of a natural river or
of air; while the latter must be founded upon prescription on
grant, express or implied, but the character of the rights,
when acquired, are the same.
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In Radcliff v. The Mayor of Brooklyn, (4 Coms. 195),
there is a dictum which disapproves Lasala v. Holbrook, sup-
ra. This was an action to recover damages for an injury to
plaintiff's property by the precipitation of his soil into a
street which the defendant had graded by authority of the
legislature. There was no superincumbent weight upon the
soil, and there was no charge that the defendants acted mal-
iciously or with want to skill or care. The court 'said, that
the defendants are a public corporation, and the act in ques-
tion was done for the benefit of the public and by authority
of the legislature, and the Chief Justice said, that a man
may do many things under a lawful authority, or in his own
land, which may result in injury to the property of another,
without being answerable for the consequences, and, indeed,
an act under lawful authority, if done in a proper manner,
can never subject the party to an action, whatever conse-
quences may follow; and the court criticized the dictum of
Rolle, and observed that if that doctrine was carried out to
its legitimate consequences, it would often deprive men of
the whole beneficial use of their property, and an unimproved
lot in a city would be worth little or nothing to the owner
unless he was allowed to dig in it for the purpose of build-
ing, and the Chief Justice thought that the law had super-
ceded the necessity of negotiating with one's neighbor for
such purposes, and that it gave every man such a title to his
own land that he might use it for all the purposes to which
such lands are usually applied, provided he exercised proper
care and skill to prevent any unnecessary injury to the ad-
joining land owner. And although this case, (Radcliff v.
Mayor, supra), has been cited in many cases, as an authority,
it has always been limited to acts done for the public bene-
fit. (Tinsman v. P. P., 2 Dutch. 148)
7ut the dictum above referred to was denied in
Farrand v. T1arshall, (21 Barb. 409), decided in 1855, where
it was said that the only point decided in Radcliff v. The
M1ayor, supra, was, that a municipal corporation acting under
an authority conferred by the legislature, to grade, level
and improve streets and highways, if they exercise proper
care and skill, are not responsible for the consequential
damages which may be sustained by those who own lands bounded
by the street or highway.
And this case of Farrand v. Marshall, supra, is the
leading one on this subject in NTew York, and one to which re-
ference is always made. The facts were as follows: The
plaintiff and defendant were adjoining land owners in the
City of Hudson. The land of the plaintiff, at its extremity,
is in its natural state and supported by the lands of the de-
fendant, and it has always been thus laterally supported. It
is the right of the plaintiff that he may enjoy his land in
the condition in which it was placed by nature, and no one
should be permitted to render his enjoyment insecure or des-
troy it altogether by removing its natural support. The de-
fendant had been, and was, engaged in excavating the soil on
his own land, which supports the plaintiff's close, and had
given notice to the plaintiff that he intended to pursue his
excavations up to the line, and to an indefinite depth. The
plaintiff's land had begun to subside and he claimed that if
the excavations continued, it would fall over into the pit
upon the defendant's land. The defendant's excavations were
not made with the view of improving the land or enjoying it
in the manner that land is uaually enjoyed, but he was engag-
ed in converting the earth thus removed into brick, and he is
allowed to do this, provided he does not interfere with the
paramount right of others to the possession and enjoyment of
their property, or the natural right which they possess to
have their land surrounded and protected by the adjacent soil.
And, to digress for a moment, the reasons advanced
by the court in this case as to the dictum in Radcliff v.
The Mayor, supra, were,- that it was unnecessary, in order to
decide the case, to mention the doctrine in Rolle at all, but
that it had become the custom at the bar to give a wide range
of discussion and accordingly the dictum in Rolle was attack-
ed, with an expression of opinion as to its unsoundness, and
we cannot regard the case as authority binding us to say that
a man may destroy his neighbor's land by depriving it of its
natural support, when such land is in the natural state, and
that it is damnum absque injuria.
But to return to the subject. The court discusses
the subject why a man cannot recover for a house built on the
extremity of his own land but may when there is no house
there, when the circumstances are the same. And they say, as
an original question they would certainly doubt the correct-
ness of the position, that though a man may have recently
erected a house on the confines of his land, his adjoining
neighbor may, without being answerable for the consequences
should the house fall into the pit, excavate his land to an
extraordinary and unreasonable depth, not for the purpose of
improving and enjoying it as land is usually enjoyed, but to
abstract the soil itself and to convert it into brick. It is
said that it is the fault of the one building the house, as
he could not by his act hinder his neighbor from making the
most profitable use of his land, but it is difficult to per-
ceive how it is his fault, in a legal sense, when lawfully
using his land; as it was quite as lawful for him to build
there as for his neighbor to dig down. Neither could lawful-
ly prevent the other from a reasonable use of his own to the
injury of his neighbor. And in the case cited by Rolle, and
others holding that a man who builds his house upon the mar-
gin of land cannot recover, were thought to fall within the
qualification of the maxim, "that he who complains of the use
that another makes of his own property, must himself be free
from fault." And the court said, that it may be that this
principle was erroneously applied, but if it were at all im-
portant here, it is perhaps too late for us to question the
soundness of the application to either of the latter cases,
as in this case the subject of buildings does not cor-e in.
And it is obvious that if the defendant continues to make the
excavation the plaintiff's land will subside and fall into
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the pit made by the excavations, and this must not be permit-
ted and the defendant is restrained from excavating or remov-
ing any soil adjoining the plaintiff's premises, which shall
cause the plaintiff's land, by reason of the withdrawal of
the lateral support to fall away and subside.
And as to the argument in Radcliff v. The Tayor,
supra, based on the inconvenience of applying the principle
discussed to proprietors of city lots, the court said, that
although this doctrine was put forth under the sanction of a
distinguished name, it is unsatisfactory to overthrow rights
"standing on natural justice and essential to the protection
and enjoyment of property in the soil."
In cGuire v. Grant, (I Dutch. 356),it is said that
the distinction that a man may recover for an injury done to
his land when he could not, under the same circumstances
recover for the injuries to his buildings, at first view
seems paradoxical. But it appears upon reason and principle
that this distinction is founded in reason and sound princi-
ple. Thus if every proprietor of land was at liberty to dig
and mine at pleasure upon his own soil, without considering
what effect this would have upon the lands of his neighbors,
it is obvious that such excavating would in many cases cause
the falling of the land adjoining, and as far as the mere
support of the soil is concerned, such support must have been
afforded as long as the land was in existence, and this seems
to be a right of property and naturally attached to the soil.
ut where anything has been done to increase the pressure,
the right to support is not a property right but rather in
the nature of an easement, and no man has a right to such in-
creased support unless the building is of ancient erection or
gets its right of lateral support from grant.
In Richardson v. R. R., (25 Vt. 465), the court
adopted the distinction of Rolle made between encumbered and
unencumbered land, and held, that where the defendant has
made an excavation so near to the line of the plaintiff's
land that a part of the soil had fallen away, the injury is
such as to deprive the owner of a portion of his soil, to
which his right is absolute and a recovery can be had.
As an illustration of the kind of cases that follow
TLadcliff v. The :ayor, supra, I will call attention to the
case of the City of Quincy v. Tones, (76 Ill. 231), where it
was said t_'at the case of Farrand v. 7Marshall, supra, simply
decided, that a man may dig on his own land, but not so near
that of his neighbor as to cause the land of the latter to
fall into a pit and that it is not in conflict with the rule
that the owner of a building, in the absence of a grant or
prescriptive right, is not entitled to have it sustained by
the lateral support of his neighbor's soil. This was an act-
ion for damages for injury to plaintiff's house by reason of
the defendant, a municipal corporation, changing the level of
the street. The court held there could be no recovery and
said, that if injury is sustained to a building in conse-
quence of the withdrawal of the lateral support of the neigh-
boring soil, when it has been withdrawn with reasonable skill
and care to avoid unnecessary injury, there can be no recov-
ery; but if injury is done the building by the careless and
negligent manner in which the soil is withdrawn, the owner is
entitled to recover to the extent of the injury thus occas-
ioned. But this applies only to cases where the owner of the
soil has no other right to the lateral support of the adja-
cent soil than results from the naked ownership of the soil,
and does not apply where there is a valid right to burden the
adjacent soil with the claim of lateral support resulting
from contract or prescription. An illustration of this lat-
ter right would be where a common owner of the soil original-
ly held both parcels,- that on which plaintiff's house was
built, and that on which the defendant subsequently excavat-
ed,- and it was held that the plaintiff was charged with the
duty of supporting not merely the soil, but the house of
plaintiff's parcel. (Hlumphries v. Broyden, 12 2* B. 743)
But it can be readily seen that this case of Quincy
v. Jones can be distinguished from Farrand v. Mvarshall, in
that it applies to acts done for the public benefit.
In Transportation Co. v. Chicago, (99 U. S. 635),
the court said, that it may be admitted that the general rule
is, that every land owner has a right to have his land pre-
served unbroken, and ti-at an adjoining owner excavating on
his own land is subject to this restriction, that he must not
remove the earth so near the land of his neigh or that his
neighbor's soil will crumble away under its own weight and
fall upon his land.
But this right of support extends to land only in
its natural condition. It does not protect whatever is plac-
ed upon the soil increasing the downward and lateral pressure.
If it did it would be in the power of a lot owner, by erect-
ing heavy buildings on his lot, to greatly abridge the right
of his neighbor to use his lot. It would make the rirht of
the prior occupant greatly superior to those of the latter-
In Charles v. Pankin, (22 311o. 566), the action was
brought to recover damages for injuries to plaintiff's build-
ings by reason of the improper excavations upon the lot of
the defendant, an adjacent proprietor. The court discusses
the question of lateral support from the earliest times and
refers especially to Thurston v. Hancock, supra, and said,
that although every proprietor of land has a right to the sup-
port of the soil of an adjacent lot, as a natural servitude
or easement, yet this servitude does not impose upon the ad-
joining proprietor the obligation of furnishing increased
support where the lateral pressure is increased by the erec-
tion of buildings, unless such a right of servitude has been
conferred by grant on the lapse of time. And the decisive
question in fi xing the liability of the defendant is, was
there negligence in view of the circumstances of the case?
The test of liability in Rockwood v. -Tilson, (II
Cushing 221) was: T1.as the work managed and executed with
such care and caution as men of common prudence usually exer-
cise in the management of their own business?
And a similar test was laid down in Smith v. Tand-
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esty, (31 1Tiss. 411), thus: Y7as the work manwfed and execut-
ed -ith, such care as a ran of ordinary prudence usually
exercises in the management of his business?
In conclusicn it may be said that the right of one
land owner to excavate to the extent of ten feet, without
affording arny protection to his neighbor, is the rule of the
connen law, (Panton v. }Tollard, supra), and has been left un-
changed by statute. But if the land owner excavates below
ten feet, the statute applies, (in lew York County see Laws
1882, Oh. 4TO, Sec. 474), and the excavating owner must pro-
tect :-is neighbor's wall, upon being afforded by the owner of
the adjoining land the necessary license to enter for the
purpose; and it is the duty of the excavating owner to re-
quest such permission, and if he does not, he is liable for
all damages suffered in consequence. (Dorirty v. Rapp, 72
1T. Y. 307)
But it is equally clear that if the adjoining owner
does not intend to go below the statutory limit of ten feet,
he is under no obligation, aside from notice, to protect him,
as he must in such a case, according to the rules of the com-
mon law, protect himself.

